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RATIONALE OF CORPORATE AND NON-CORPO-
RATE SURETYSHIP DECISIONS-III
By WALTER E. TREANOR*
IV. DEFENSES, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF THE COR-
PORATE SURETY.
A. Defenses.
Cases involving rights, remedies and defenses of the corporate
surety have not been as numerous as those involving questions
of interpretation or construction of the contract between the
surety and the party secured. The preponderance of cases of
the latter type is no doubt due in part to the success of the
courts in construing the terms of the contract "liberally" enough
to avoid the question of modification or variation.91 But the
cases that have dealt with substantive defenses have disclosed
an unmistakable trend in the direction of modifying the abso-
lute defenses which have been allowed generally to the private
surety.9 2 On the whole the modifications have been consonant
* See biographical note, p. 306.
91 In U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. U. S., for use, etc., (1903) 191
U. S. 416, a creditor who had furnished materials to the contractor had
extended time of payment by accepting 30 and 60-day notes from the con-
tractor. The surety claimed a release on the ground of extension of time.
The court disposes of this contention as a question of interpretation.
"The guarantor is ignorant of the parties with whom the principal may
contract, the amount, the nature, and the value of the materials required,
as well as the time when the payment for them will become due. These
particulars it would probably be impossible for the principal ever to fur-
nish, and it is to be assumed the surety contracts with knowledge of this
fact. Not knowing .... when the bills for them will mature, it can
make no difference to him whether they were originally purchased on
credit of 60 days, or whether, after materials were furnished, the time for
payment is extended 60 days, and a note given for this amount, maturing
at that time. If a person deliberately contracts for an uncertain liability
he ought not to complain when the uncertain becomes certain."
92Lumpkin, J., in Bethune . Dozier, (1851) 10 Ga. 234 furnished a
classic expression of the rule, as well as the theory back of it, which gives
the private surety an absolute defense when changes are made in the princi-
pal obligation without his consent.
"No principal of law is better settled at this day, than that, the under-
taking of surety, being one strictissimi juris, he cannot, either by law
or in equity, be bound farther or otherwise, than he is by the very terms
of his contract: and that if the parties to the original contract think proper
to change the terms of it without the consent of the surety (which it is not
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with sound principles of contract law and, in so far as they
mark a change from the rules applied to the liability of private
sureties, are justified by changes in the facts out of which the
suretyship relation arises.93
1. Extension of time.
In no situation has the private surety's absolute right to
stand on the letter of his contract been more universally recog-
nized than in the case of extension of time to the debtor by the
creditor. The rule which allowed an absolute discharge in case
of an extension of time was first applied to contracts to pay
money. Here an extension of time represented a material
change in the whole contract. In theory, at least, it always in-
creased the risk and deprived the surety of his right to pay
at maturity and thus interfered with his right of subrogation.94
What had been an equitable defense, allowed at the discretion
disputed they have a right to do) the surety is discharged. He is not bound
by the old contract, for that has been abrogated by the new; neither can
it be split into parts, so as to be his contract to a certain extent and not
for the residue; he is eithar bound in toto, or not at all.
"Neither is it of any consequence that the alteration in the contract
is trivial, nor even that it is to the advantage of the surety. Non haec
in foedera veni, is an answer in the mouth of the surety from which the
obligee can never extricate his case, however innocent or by whatever kind
intentions to all parties he may have been actuated."
93 Frequently it is not clear whether the corporate surety is being held
by reason of a construction of the contract in favor of the party secured
or by a denial to the corporate surety of a defense ordinarily allowed to a
non-corporate surety. For example, whether the court means that by con-
struing the contract "most strongly in favor of the obligee" the "extension
of time" is not a breach, or, granting it is a breach, that it will not be a
defense to the surety unless there is damage caused by the extension."
Fidelity and Deposit Co. "v. John Gill & Sons, (1925) 270 S. W. 700, 705,
706.
94 The non-existence in actual experience of any basis for this rule
has been pointed out.
"We are not aware of any instance in which a surety ever in practice
exercised this right (i. e., to apply to creditor and pay him off); certainly
the cases in which a surety uses it must be very rare. Nevertheless, the
surety has the right, and if the creditor bonds himself not to sue the prin-
cipal debtor, for however short a time, he does interfere with the surety's
theoretical right to sue in his name during such period. It has been settled
by decisions that such an interference with the rights of the surety-in
the immense majority of cases not damaging him to the extent even of a
shilling-must operate to deprive the creditor of his right of recourse
against the surety, though it nmay be for thousands of pounds. But though
it seems-if it may be permitted to speak in such terms of the doctrine
sanctioned by very great lawyers-consistent with neither justice nor com-
mon sense, it has been long so firmly established that it can only be altered
by the legislature." Cockburn, J., in Swiire v. Rednion, 1 Q. B. D. 536.
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-of the chancellor came to be a hard and fast rule of law applied
to any case of extension without reference to injury to the surety
and without regard to the nature of the contract.9 5
Whatever technical reasons may be adduced for the rule in
the case of ordinary promises to pay money, these reasons would
seem to lose their force when the extension of time does not actu-
ally involve an extension of the time for the performance of the
original obligation. For example, in Murray City v. Banks et
al.,96 the defendant surety company was surety on the bond of
a bank official who defaulted in his accounts, and upon the dis-
covery of the shortage the bank took a note for the amount
payable in six months. Defendant claimed release on two
grounds: (1) payment by the note; (2) extension of time on
the obligation sued on. The court found that the note had not
been taken in payment and announced unqualifiedly:
"We hold that the extension of time of payment, unless resultant harm
is shown, does not discharge a paid surety."
The court quotes an earlier case97 to the effect that "to allow
such companies to collect and retain premiums for their services,
graded according to the nature and extent of the risk, and then
to repudiate their obligations on slight pretexts that have no
relation to the risk, would be most unjust and immoral, and
would be a perversion of the wise and just rules designed for
the protection of voluntary sureties." One readily agrees with
the sentiment of the excerpt but the result can be rested upon
more tangible grounds. There was no change in the principal
contract; there was no increase in the risk, i. e., no increase
in the probability of the happening of the contingency upon
which the surety company's liability to respond rested; it had
already happened. The transaction came within the rule gov-
erning acts of the creditor which affect the interest of the
surety, such as release or exchange of securities, and which must
be injurious to the surety to constitute a defense, and even then,
only pro tanto. On principle the same result should be reached
in the case of a private surety.
95 Cf. "But such an agreement between the principal parties is perfectly
valid and legal; and until some method can be devised for depriving the
principal of the benefits of a valid agreement, or of binding the surety to
an agreement to which he never acceded (a work hitherto thought not
to be within the powers of either courts or legislatures) the discharge of the
latter must ensue." Ranney, J., in Ide v. Churchill, 14 0. S. 383.
90 (1923) 62 Utah 296, 219 Pac. 246.
97 Rule . Anderson, (1912) 160 Mo. App. 347, 142 S. W. 358.
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In Philadelphia etc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.98 the surety
company became surety on a contractor's bond to secure pay-
ment to subcontractors and others for materials and labor fur-
nished for the prosecution of the work. The use plaintiffs fur-
nished materials and labor, and at the time, or before, the debt
came due, accepted a note which was renewed and never paid.
During the running of the note the city paid over a balance due
to the contractor, and at a time when he was probably insolvent.
This suit was brought within the period limited in the bond.
Judgment against the defendant company was affirmed. The
reasons of the court are indicated in the following:
"In its nature the obligation was more of a contract of insurance than
of suretyship: so long as the extensions of credit did not go beyond the two
year limit for suit fixed in the bond, and in the absence of fraud or unfair
dealing on the part of the subcontractors to the prejudice of the surety, or
of material harm actually suffered, the surety was not released..... .We
find no direct averment in the affidavits of defense that the surety was
actually harmed by the extensions granted to the contractors, and the
facts stated herein are not sufficient in themselves to raise such a pre-
sumption. For all that appears, the contractor may have paid every cent
of the cash received to other material men or mechanics who did work
on the building. In a case of this kind there is no presumption that the
surety company is harmed, the prejudice must be made to appear, and the
suggestions of mere contingencies or possibilities is not enough."
Almost all cases, of which the foregoing is an example, which
involve the giving of time by a materialman to a contractor, are
treated by the courts as if they presented a variation of the
terms of the principal contract, consisting of an extension of
time for performance of the principal's obligation. 99 But in no
case has the surety's contract, or the principal contract, re-
quired that the indebtedness between contractor and material-
men be evidenced on any particular form; nor has either con-
tract set an ultimate date of maturity for these obligations, ex-
cept as might be implied from the usual clause limiting the time
within which suit must be brought on the surety's contract.
There is ordinarily nothing in the principal contract to regu-
98 (1911) 231 Pa. St. 208, 80 Atl. 62, Ann. Cas. 1912, B. 1805.
99"We hold that the extension of time of payment, unless resultant
harm is shown, does not discharge a paid surety in a bond such as is
before us. It is not found that the surety suffered harm from the exten-
sion." Standard Salt & Cement Co. v. Surety Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 121,
158 N. W. 802.
In People for use, etc., v. Traves, (1915) 188 Mich. 345, 347, 348, 154
N. W. 120, the court "recognized as applicable to the facts of this case"
the rule that a surety company is not released by an extension of time
in the absence of proof of injury to the surety."
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late the form of agreement between the contractor and his cred-
itors 00 and these extensions of time, even under the rules ap-
plied to private suretyship, should be assimilated to transactions
between creditor and surety rather than considered variations of
the principal contract. The courts, however, have assimilated
them to the old category of "extension of time" and we may
conclude that in all cases of extension of time of the payment
of the very obligation secured these modifications of the former
rules will be applied in the case of a corporate surety.10 1
The cases uniformly hold that a mere extension of time will
not as a matter of law discharge the surety; some injury must
result. In all the cases I have examined there was no showing
of harm to the surety as a result of the extension, and conse-
quently no holding directly on the effect of an extension plus
injury to the surety. The statements of the courts justify the
inference that if harm actually results, the corporate surety
will be discharged, not merely allowed to recoup in damages.10 2
The decisions agree also that no harm is presumed and that the
surety must plead and prove the injury.
If the rule becomes established that the corporate surety is
released by a showing of a harm resulting from an extension
of time, that would only be applying a rule which many agree
to be too liberal even in case of private surety. There is no
convincing reason why a good faith extension made for the
purpose of enabling the principal debtor to discharge the obli-
gation should be availed of by a corporate surety for more than
a pro tanto defense. If the extension transaction is purely a
voluntary extension transaction amounting in effect to a new
loan, it ought to be considered the same as a discharge of the
100 In Southern Surety Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, (1925) 275 S. W.
436, 442, the court notes that these extensions of time of payment for ma-
terials do not modify the principal contract. The Court says:
...... it was the original contract between H. & P. and the county
that fixed the liability of the appellant surety company and not the exten-
sion of payment of the note, and the agreement of June 1, 1922, which
was in no way related to the original contract with the county. The time
for the performance of the contract with the county was never changed or
extended by the agreement of June 18t or by the taking of the notes."
(Italics mine.)
101 To explain and justify this radical modification of the orthodox
rule there is constant insistence that the corporate surety's contract is
one of insurance. Cf. "In its nature the obligation was more of a contract
of insurance than of suretyship .... Philadelphia, etc. v. Fidelity &
Depart Co., supra, p. 284.
102 See supra, p. 284, and note 99.
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principal obligation and consequently a complete release of the
surety, corporate or private.
2. Modifications of the Principal Contract.
(a) Modifications by agreement in limine.
One material consideration in determining the effect of a
change in the terms of the principal contract is the time at
which the change is made. Frequently it is at the time when
the principal contract becomes binding and subsequent to the
offer of the surety. If the entering into the principal contract
constitutes an acceptance of the offer of the surety and if the
terms of the principal contract as changed vary in the slightest
from the requirements of the offer, the surety never becomes
bound, for his offer is not accepted. Page v. Kreky 0 3 is an ex-
cellent illustration. The surety made an offer of a series of uni-
lateral contracts of guaranty and included in his offer the exact
terms of the principal transactions which he would guarantee.
The offer was not accepted.
Modifications of the principal contract which are made in
good faith, in the course of performance, for the purpose of
expediting or of more effectively or even of more satisfactorily
accomplishing the general object of the contract, involve differ-
ent considerations than modifications in the terms of the con-
tract deliberately made for the sole purpose of changing the
general object provided for in the terms of the contract. It is
not unreasonable to expect that in the course of performance
changes will be made, due to unforeseen developments, or to
mistaken understanding of the terms of the contract: often to
help the principal obligor stave off default. But it is not reason-
able for the party secured and the creditor to deliberately modify
the terms of the principal contract, while they are free from the
pressure of circumstances, for the sole purpose of changing the
effect of the contract. There is no reason why a corporate
surety is not entitled to his contract to the same extent as con-
tracting parties generally. Changes in the principal contract
made before performance by the principal and party secured,
are from the standpoint of the surety analogous to breaches in
limine in bipartite contracts. In contracts law a breach in
limine need not be as substantial, in order to release the non-
offending party, as a subsequent breach in course of perform-
ance.
10 4
103 Sup'ra, p. 125.
104 "It is sometimes said that any breach in limine will excuse the
other party; and at least in the law of sales of personal property this
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On the analogy of breach in limine a corporate surety ought
to be released by a change in the terms of the principal contract
amounting to considerably less than a substitution of a new
contract, if made before performance, even though it can not be
shown that the surety was injured or that there was an increase
in the chance of non-performance on the part of the principal.
In Matthew v. Hillo5 the surety was released on the ground of
"substitution of a new contract." In this case the sole modifica-
tion consisted of dispensing with two bronze tablets on the sides
of a memorial monument, with a consequent reduction in cost
of only five hundred dollars out of ten thousand dollars. The
change was made by agreement between principal and obligee
before the principal began work on the monument. While there
was a substantial change made in the original contract, and
made in limine, it would seem to do considerable violence to the
facts as well as to the intent of the parties to say there was a
substitution of a new contract. That a change in limine must
be one in substance, and not merely nominal is illustrated by
the case of Sokoloff v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.106 The surety's
bond purported to cover twelve notes of equal amount identified
in the bond by amount and date of maturity. Instead of twelve
notes, one aggregating the total amount was given, but with
a schedule of twelve payments corresponding to the due dates
appearing in the bond. In holding that the surety company was
not released the court distinguishes from Burdette v. Walsh,1o7
in which no note was given, although the bond recited that it
was given as security for a note.
(b) Modifications Destroying the Identity of the Contract.
As already suggested the stock justification for discharge of
the private surety, when any changes in the terms of the prin-
cipal contract, or variation therefrom have been made, is
summed up in "non haec in foedera veni". The assumption that
there is a new contract is usually not consistent, with the facts,
or with the intention of the parties, and as between principals
the same amount of variation in an ordinary contract would be
considered a breach and not an abandonment. But in case of
continued departures a point must be reached at which it-can not
be said that the contract is in any true sense being performed.
When this point is reached, the non-offending party is released
extreme statement is nearly, if not quite justified." Williston on Con-
tracts, Vol. II, sec. 844.
105 (1926) (Mo. App.) 287 S. W. 789.
106 (1927) (Pa.) 35 At. 746.
107Supra, p. 204.
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from his obligation to perform instead of being compelled to
accept compensation for the deviations of the other party. No
one would insist that a surety company should be held for the
performance by its principal of a contract admittedly distinct
from the one intended to be secured even though the contracts
involved substantially the same type and extent of obligations.
It seems equally clear that the surety should not be held to
respond for default of his principal if, by successive changes,
or, by one big change, either before or after performance has
started, a new contract has in effect been substituted for the
original. 0 8 On principle, then, a surety should be released if
the principal contract has been in effect abandoned, whether
this results from changes in the terms of the contract expressly
made by consent of the party secured and the principal, or from
repeated departures assented to in the course of performance.
The opinion in Matthew v. Hill ° 9 assumes that a new contract
was substituted "for the original contract by the mutual agree-
ment of the parties thereto", and if this assumption is supported
by the facts the surety was property released. The surety was
a private surety but the decision did not rest on that fact. It is
a fair inference that the court intends its reasoning to include
a corporate surety. Distinguishing this case from a corporate
surety case, in which the surety was not released, the court said:
"There was no substitution of a new contract for the original contract
by the mutual agreement of the parties thereto (as in the case at bar),
but, to the contrary, the changes which were made in the plans and specifi-
cations were made merely at the request of the contractor and with the
acquiescence of the city."
After referring to an earlier case 10 in which statements were
made to the effect that a corporate surety would be discharged
only in case variations were such as would increase its burdens,
108 A surety guaranteed that his principal, as purchaser, would pay
the plaintiff, seller for "a steam engine of twelve inch bore and twenty
inch stroke: two cylinder boilers, each thirty feet long and twenty-five
inches in diameter; and all the shafts, pulleys, and iron necessary ..
etc.
By agreement of the vendor and vendee an engine with three boilers, and
of greater capacity and power and with changes in accessories, was substi-
tuted at an increased price. Such considerable changes affecting the entire
subject matter of the principal contract would justify a discharge of the
surety on the ground of substitution of a new contract. Grant v. Smith,
(1871) 46 N. Y. 93.
1o9 Supra, p. 287.
110 City of Kenneth v. Condruction Co., 273 Mo. 279; 202 S. W. 558.
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either in cost of construction or in the extension of time for
performance, the opinion makes the following distinctions:
"This language, however, affords no support for plaintiff's contention
in the case at bar. The ultimate test is whether there has been a substi-
tution of a new contract for an old one. In the city of Kennett case there*
had been no such substitution. Upon the contractor's request, the city
had merely acquiesced in his deviation from the plans and specifications,
but the original contract had been retained. In such a case whether the
surety remains bound depends upon whether the changes are so extensive
as to destroy the identity of the original contract."
One might imply from the statement in Matthew '. Hill that
changes in the terms of the principal contract "made by the
mutual agreement of the parties thereto" might be given the
legal effect of substitution of a new contract whereas these same
changes "made merely at the request of the contractor and with
the acquiescence of the city" would not "destroy the identity
of the original contract". If, as suggested above, it is sound
to resort to the analogy of breach in limine, then the time at
which, and not the method by which, the change in the original
contract is made, should be the distinguishing fact. After
performance has been started, however, no greater legal
effect should be given to changes made in thecontract by mutual
consent, which result in deviations from the original contract,
than to deviations consented to which result in changes from
the original contract. In either case the surety should remain
bound unless the changes are "so extensive as to destroy the
identity of the original contract" or have the result of substan-
tially increasing the chance of non-performance by the prin-
cipal."'
In Matthew v. Hil there was manifestly no increase of bur-
den for the surety, but frequently the change in, or deviation
from, the terms of the principal contract may involve an increase
of hazard for the surety. This was true in Commercial Nat.
Bank v. Indemnity Co." 2 The plaintiff bank and the principal
entered into a contract by the terms of which the plaintiff obli-
gated itself. to advance money to the principal to enable it to
finance the purchase of automobiles for retail. By the terms of
the contract the plaintiff bank agreed to advance to the princi-
pal, M. Company, eighty per cent of the value of each car, and
the principal was to give the plaintiff a chattel mortgage on
each car, and a note bearing 6 percent interest, the bank to be
paid out of the proceeds of the sale of each car. The defendant
111 Infra, p. 292 et seq.
112 (1925) Court of Appeals D. C. 10 Fed. 2d 641.
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surety company gave its bond to secure performance by the
principal. The principal defaulted and the bank sued the surety
on its bond. The surety company demurred to the complaint
on the ground that the complaint showed the principal had ad-
vanced more than eighty per cent of the value of the cars, and
that the notes called for eight percent interest instead of six
percent. Demurrer sustained and on appeal this judgment was
affirmed. The court's reasons were as follows:
"It appears, accordingly, that the transactions which gave rise to the
alleged indebtedness of the motor company to the bank were not such as
came within the scope of the bond. Consequently the security was not
bound to answer for them."
In this case there was no mutual consent to change the terms
of.the contract followed by a deviation, but the change took the
form of deviation in performance. The change, however, at
least as respects the first transaction, was in limine. This case,
then, includes: a substantial change in limine, an increase in the
burden of the surety, and a performance which was "not such
as came within the bond". The principal contract was purely a
loan and repayment agreement, and a change in both the amount
of the principal and interest would seem to justify the holding
that the transaction did not come within the scope of the con-
tract, in other words, that there was a substitute contract.
(c) Minor Modifications and Variations or Transaction Af-
fecting the Principal Contract.
Granting that modifications or variations in a particular case
do not change the identity of the contract, they may affect the
interest of the surety by:
1. Increasing the expense to the surety in case of default by
the principal, especially by interfering with his remedies for
reimbursement.
2. Increasing the chance of non-performance by the principal.
Inequitable conduct in the form of transactions between the
creditor and the principal, or by the creditor independently of
the principal, which affect the interests of the surety, also be-
longs here. The principal contract may frequently be practically
unchanged and yet transactions between the creditor and the
principal or conduct by the creditor may increase substantially
the actual loss of the surety. In thse cases as in the cases of ex-
tension of time, the courts say there must be injury in order to
justify the release of the corporate surety. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Construction Co.11 3 is in point. The plaintiff
11s (1926) 12 Fed. 2d 972.
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sublet to M a certain piece of road construction and the surety
company became surety to plaintiff for performance by M. The
contract between plaintiff and M. which was approved by the
defendant was typewritten on two sheets of paper. After the
bond had been executed the plaintiff and M. agreed that M.
should do certain additional work and provisions covering the
additional work were typewritten on a third sheet of paper, each
party signing at the bottom of the page, and this sheet was in-
serted between the two sheets of the original instrument. Extra
payment was provided for the additional work. The court said:
"A contract may be modified by adding provisions which do not change
the legal effect of those contained in the original contract. Under the evi-
dence the defendant properly could be held liable for M's failure to per-
form the work first contracted for; the change made in the original con-
tract not being such as materially varied the contract, so far as the com-
pensated surety agreed to be responsible for performance of it, or as in-
volved harm to such surety; the existence, whether before or after the date
of the making of the bond sued on, of M's obligation to do work other than
that described in the bond, not having the effect of altering essentially the
obligation for which the defendant agreed to become bound."
Clearly the intention of the parties was to add to the original
contract and it was thereby changed, and changed in limine.
The court concluded that there had not been a material change
in the original contract. There was apparently no appreciable
increase in the risk of non-performance by the principal and no
showing that the surety suffered any loss. The court points out
that the surety was not responsible for the principal's perform-
.ance of the additional work, and, in the absence of a showing
of any interference with the principal's performance of the
original contract, the result is sound. The court treats the addi-
tional agreement as an independent contract supported by its
own separate consideration.
One of the commonest modifications or deviations which has
come before the courts consists of making payments to the prin-
cipal in excess of the amount provided for in the principal con-
tract. In Pickens County v. National Surety Company 14 the
obligee had made excessive payments, but in order to help the
principal carry on. Apparently the excess payments had been
applied to the performance of the principal's obligation. In
concluding that the surety was not entitled to relief the court
said:
" ..it (surety company) must show that it has suffered some injury
by reason of departure from the strict terms of the contract, before it can
114 (1926) 13 Fed. 2d 758.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
for that reason be discharged from its liability. And payments to a con-
tractor in advance of the time specified in the contract are expressly held
not to be such a departure from or change of the terms of the contract as
will discharge from liability a bonding company which has guaranteed
its performance, in the absence of a showing that the bonding company
has suffered injury therefrom."
In an Iowa case of Hileman & Gint v. Faus et al.115 the facts
on record disclosed that all the advancements had gone to ma-
terialmen, whose claims were covered by the bond. In passing
on the appeal the court stated the rule as to presumption of
injury as follows:
"When money is paid to the contractor the surety might be prejudiced
because the contractor might use the money for his own separate pur-
poses and leave the surety to pay for the labor and materials to complete
the building. The presumption referred to is open to rebuttal."
Pickens County v. National Surety Company, supra, would ap-
parently put the burden of showing injury on the surety and in-
ferentially holds that when injury is shown the surety company
will be released. The Iowa case is not so clear on the extent
of the defense allowed to the suerty company, but presumes in-
jury from the advancements subject to rebuttal.
A case much cited for the doctrine that a corporate surety
is an insurer is Young v. American Bonding Co.n1 6 But the sig-
nificant holding in the case is that a corporate surety is released
by any change in the principal contract which increases the
chance of non-performance by the principal obligor. The re-
viewing court does a real service in pointing out the significance
of an increase in the chance of non-performance by the principal
as distinguished from injury or actual loss. The court assumes
that the business of surety companies "is in all essential particu-
lars that of insurance" and bases its discussion on that assump-
tion. The reasoning of the court is just as applicable to the case
of a private surety, however, for fundamentally the understand-
ing of the surety, the principal, and the party secured, is that the
surety's assuming the chance of nonperformance by the princi-
pal is the very essence of any surety's promise ;117 and conse-
quently any conduct by the party secured or transactions be-
115 (1916) 178 Ia. 644, 158 N. W. 597.
116 (1910) 228 Pa. St. 373, 77 Atl. 623.
117 This has been obscured in the case of the private surety for the
reason that any variation of the principal contract was sufficient to re-
lease the surety without making any distinctions between variations that
(1) increased the risk of non-performance, (2) caused loss to the surety,
(3) did neither. Foey's Adm'Wr. v. Robertson's Guardian, (1927) (Ky.) 268
S. W. 851. Stearns on Suretyship, section 72.
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tween the part secured and the principal which materially in-
terfere with performance by the principal-i. e., increase the
risk of the surety-should give an absolute defense to the surety.
The corporate surety decisions have been regularly distinguish-
ing between cases in which the modifications have caused no
actual loss and those in which modifications have caused loss to
the surety, but the facts usually have not required a distinction
between cases in which the change imperiled the surety by an
increase in the risk and those in which the change clearly did
not increase the risk of the surety, but caused actual loss to
him. In Young v. American Bonding Company a modification
in the original contract deprived the principal of the possibility
of utilizing "by anticipation" certain securities. The court sums
up the points as follows:
"To that extent it increased the hazard of his accomplishing what he
had undertaken to do, and correspondingly increased the risk the appellee
had underwritten."
"It follows there is but one way by which it is to be determined whether
the variance complained of was a material variance. The test is to be
found in the .answer to the question whether it substantially increased the
chances of the loss insured against ..... It is not a question whether the
variance actually caused the breach of the bond, but whether it was such
a variance as a reasonably careful and prudent person undertaking the
risk would have regarded as substantially increasing the chances of loss."
The court decided that the change substantially increased the
chances of loss and affirmed the judgment of the lower court
discharging the surety company. The case not only points out
the materiality to the surety of an increase in risk, but indicates
a standard for the determination of "material variance" as ap-
plied to risk. I suggest the following statement of the standard
in suretyship phraseology:
"Was the variance complained of such as a reasonably careful and pru-
dent person, about to become bound as surety, would have regarded as sub-
stantially increasing the chances of non-performance by the principal?"
Hamilton v. Republic Casualty Co. et al."18 furnishes a clear
distinction between an advance payment of unauthorized sums
to the principal which may merely increase the amount of loss
of the surety, and an advancement under such circumstances as
to increase materially the chance of non-performance by the
principal. The bond in question had the usual ten per cent re-
serve clause. The principal under a different contract had pre-
viously built two houses ;or the plaintiff, and unpaid material-
men were threatening to file liens on these buildings. The plain-
118 (1926) 102 W. Va. 32; 135 S. E. 259.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tiff loaned the principal enough to pay these claims and took his
note. Later, out of money due the principal under the present
contract, the obligee with the consent of the principal applied
approximately three thousand dollars on the note. The principal
defaulted and in a suit against the surety company the plaintiff
recovered judgment in the lower court. In reversing this judg-
ment the reviewing court gave the following reasons:
"The surety had not guaranteed the payment of obligations not as-
sumed under the contract. In making his collection from the estimate,
the plaintiff imposed on the contract of June 11 obligations of the con-
str3iction company incurred in former contracts. The contract of June 11
could not carry the added burden. This burden was not assumed by the
casualty company, and was such an added risk as released it from liability.
.... Any change in the contract made by the owner and the contractor,
to which the surety is not a party, and which works a material injury
to the surety, discharges the surety."119
The improper transaction between the principal obligor and
the plaintiff substantially increased the chance of non-perform-
ance by the principal. The case discloses the unsoundness of
restricting the surety to a pro tanto defense in cases of varia-
tions which do not amount to a destruction of the identity of the
principal contract. Leaving out of consideration the plaintiff's
contribution to the default of the principal, and assuming that
there was not sufficient departure from the contract to justify
a discharge of the surety on the theory of a substituted contract,
the surety could only claim a recoupment of three thousand dol-
lars and would be compelled to make good for the default of the
principal at an expenditure of a much greater sum. But when
the facts show that the plaintiff's transaction with the principal
materially contributed to, if it did not wholly cause, the default
of the principal, to compel the surety to answer for this default
would impose a burden that was not assumed by the surety and
result in a grossly unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.120
119 The court distinguishes between cases in which no prejudice is caused
the surety company, such as loans to enable the surety to carry on the
work. Cf. Monroe v. Surety Co., 47 Wash. 488, 92 Pac. 280; Museum Fine
Arts v. Am. Binding Co., 211 Mass. 124, 97 N. E. 633.
120 In Justice v. Empire State Surety Co., (1913) 209 Fed. 105, the
party secured liad advanced two thousand dollars more than was due at
the time of the default. The court said this was "a material variance which
relieved without proof of injury .... When it (clause providing for re-
tention of 10 per cent.) is not observed, and advances and overpayments
are made, it is so obviously to the prejudice of the surety that it operates
as a discharge as a matter of law." Also see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Agnew, (1907) 152 Fed. 955.
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In Maryland Casualty Company v. Eagle etc. District1 21 it was
admitted that payments were made without architect's certifi-
cates, and in excess of the ninety per cent limitation and that
various irregular transactions had occurred before the principal
defaulted. But there was no showing of an increase in the
chance of non-performance by the principal, and the court held
the surety had neither an absolute nor pro tanto defense.
The following excerpts are from the opinion of the court:
"It would seem, too, that not every circumstance prejudicial to the
interests of the surety should work a total discharge of the surety, without
any reference or consideration to the extent to which the interests of the
surety were in fact prejudiced by such circumstances."
"There can be no injustice in requiring a paid surety, when in the
business for profit, to prove that alleged delinquencies or misconduct on
the part of the indemnified resulted, not only in damages to the surety, but
the extent of such damage. That is nothing more or less than a rule ap-
plied with reference to contracts generally, except perhaps cases where
the breach of a contract is so material as to justify the other party in
rescinding the contract. We must not be understood as saying that there
can be no conduct on the part of the indemnified which will result in the
absolute discharge of the paid surety; but we say, that, as a general propo-
sition, considerations of justice are fully met when the surety is recouped
to the extent of the losses actually sustained by reason of misconduct on
the part of the indemnified." (Italics mine.)
"It is apparent that the contractor would have been obliged to throw up
his job long before he did, had he not received this financial assistance.
A departure from the terms of the contract in these various aspects kept
the contractor on the job."
"The school district and the contractor in good faith sought to work
out the situation, and to make it possible for the contractor to complete
the work. This might not have resulted to the benefit of the surety, but
it by no means appears in this case that the surety suffered any damage
by reason of this conduct, and by failing to show that it was damaged it
has failed to prove a cause of action, or that it was released from the
obligation which it had voluntarily assumed."
The last case, on its facts, is in accord with the majority of
decisions. The court presupposes:
(1) that all departures were made in good faith to enable
the principal to carry out his obligation.
(2) that no damages was actually caused to the surety.
(3) that the chance of default decreased.
No recent decision has allowed a corporate surety a defense,
absolute, or pro tanto on the above facts. The instant case ex-
pressly denies any intention of holding the position that there
can be no conduct by the party secured which would release the
surety company. The court properly refers the question of the
121 (1925) 188 Wis. 520, 205 N. W. 926. Cf. Hartford etc. Co. v. State
(Ind. App. Dec. 1927), 159 N. E. 21, in which surety company was dis-
charged by irregularities which included payment "out of the ditch fund"
of an unauthorized claim, "thereby increasing appellant's liability."
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defense to rules of contracts law, but might have noted that
whether the breach is "so material as to justify" a rescission
depends on the special suretyship relations of the parties.
(d) Representations and Warranties, Duty of Disclosure.
In the case of the private surety the problem of formal repre-
sentations and warranties is practically non-existent. As else-
where suggested there is seldom any direct negotations between
the prospective obligee and the surety-obligor, the preliminary
matters being settled by the creditor and the principal. If there
is a bond or other instrument of security separate from the
instrument embodying the principal obligation, it is regularly
prepared by the obligee and for very human reasons does not
contain formal representations and warranties. By reason of
the absence of direct dealings between the surety and the party
secured, and the absence, ordinarily, of any reliance by the
surety on the creditor in the preliminary negotiations, there is
no basis in fact, and no justification in law, for any implication
of representations and warranties, and none is implied. In re-
spect to a duty of disclosure it was early established that an
insurer was more of a favorite of the law than the private
surety. The insurer-insured contract was said to be uberrimae
fidei and a very broad duty of disclosures of all facts material
to the risk was imposed upon the insured. No such general duty
rested upon the party secured. 122 In absence of an application
by the prospective surety to the creditor for information, and
an undertaking by the latter to give information, the creditor-
obligee could maintain silence respecting many facts affecting
the principal's capacity to perform his obligation, and conse-
quently material to the risk.123
122Davies v. London etc. Co., (1878) 8 Ch. Div. 469; Hamilton v. Wat-
son, (1845) 12 Cl. & F. 117; Lee v. Jones, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 482;
Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v. Jackson, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 418.
12S Non-disclosure of the insolvency of the principal, Ham V. Greve,
(1870) 34 Ind. 18; of present indebtedness to the creditor, Palatine Ins.
Co. v. Crittenden, (1896) 18 Mont. 413, 45 Pac. 555; Domestic etc. Co. v.
Jackson, supra, note 122; Magee v. Manhattan Co., (1875) 92-U. S. 93;
of the fact that the principal was gambling or speculating during prior
employment, Atlas Bank v. Brownell, (1896) 9 R. I. 168, 11 Am. Rep. 231;
Warren v. Branch, (1879) 15 W. Va. 21; Bridges v. Miller, (1926) 150
Md. 1,132 At. 271.
For the limitation of this doctrine cf.: " .... to receive a surety
known to be acting on the belief that there are no unusual circumstances
by which his risk will be materially increased, well knowing that there are
such circumstances and having a suitable opportunity to make them known
and withholding them, must be regarded as a legal fraud, by which the
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As a result of the assumption by the courts that the corporate
surety's contract was a policy of insurance, the foregoing oc-
casioned the courts some concern in the early decisions dealing
with the contracts of the surety companies. It was evident that
the cumulative effect of an adoption both of the rule of insurance
law which required a full and voluntary disclosure of all matters
material to the risk, which were known to the insured, and
of the rules governing representations and warranties, as then
applied in insurance cases, would have been to restrict the lia-
bility of the corporate surety to a lesser one than that of the
old bond-surety, despite the application of more liberal rules
of interpretation and construction. This was clearly recognized
in one of the early Federal decisions 124 involving the question,
and the warning was given that the courts "should not perplex
themselves with regrettable technicalities of law such as have
sometimes crept into the older contracts of insurance, and have
required statutes for their removal." At another point in the
decision the court remarked:
"It would be contrary to public policy to inconsiderately allow the pro-
tection afforded by this new insurance to the vast business interests of the
country, in public administration as elsewhere, to be endangered by any
lesser indemnity than that of the old form of bond, which is being so
rapidly displaced, the new contracts being offered by the companies as
superior to the old in safety."
The gist of the court's conclusions was that "nothing is to be
implied not necessarily indicated by the words used, as might be
in other examples of insurance, when the relation of the parties
and the character of the risk are different, and where those
relations properly breed implications that would import a mean-
ing not admissible when the thing guaranteed is so far disassoci-
ated from any duty owing by the assured to the insurer as we
find in the subject matter of insurance here ;" that the liability
of the surety company is as broad as that afforded by the older
bond, "except so far as the 'provisos and conditions hereinafter
contained' shall have limited that broad liability."
The decisions have generally avoided "the regrettable techni-
calities of law" applied to insurance contracts as respects both
a duty of disclosure and implied representations or warranties.
In the treatment of formal representations and warranties the
courts follow the decisions of the jurisdictnon in insurance cases.
surety will be relieved from his contract." Bank v. Cooper, (1895) 36 Me.
179, 197.
124 Guarantee Co. of N. A. v. Mechanics' etc. Co., (1896) 80 Fed. 766.
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The "liberal construction" rule often enables the court to reduce
an apparent warranty to a representation, but in many cases it
is evident that the court is adopting a substantive rule to the
effect that warranties, like representations, can not be availed
of by the corporate surety unless-there is fraud or material in-
crease of the risk of the surety. The use by the surety com-
panies of application blanks similar in form and purpose to those
used by insurance companies, and the incorporating of stereo-
typed insurance phrases into warranties have suggested and
made easy the application of insurance rules, either by analogy
or by the more direct expedient of calling the corporate surety's
contract an insurance contract. Statutes defining the effect of
representations and warranties made "in the negotiations of
insurance" 25 have been construed to apply to contracts of cor-
porate sureties. In view of the traditional reluctance of the
courts to enlarge in the slightest a class of persons or transac-
tions covered by a statute one may be inclined to marvel at the
ease with which corporate surety companies have been brought
within the purview of statutes referring only to insurance com-
panies, and enacted before any surety companies had appeared
in the jurisdiction. Obviously the result is desirable, whether
reached by judicial construction of a statute referring to insur-
ance companies, or by a literal holding that a surety's contract
is a policy of insurance, or by a statute expressly referring to
surety companies.
The following is offered as a fair summary of the more im-
portant decisions on defenses of the corporate surety:
1. Changes in the-principal contract so radical as to amount
to a substitution of a new contract give an absolute discharge
to the surety, without reference to the question of actual injury
to the surety or increase in the risk of non-performance by the
principal.
2. On the facts of certain cases, there is support for the posi-
tion that a substantial change in the terms of the principal con-
tract will release the surety if the change is made in limine,
125 W. A. Thomas Co. National Surety Co., (1919) 142 Minn. 460, 172
N. W. 697. The section of the statute in question was as follows: "No
oral nor written representation made by the assured, or in his behalf, in
the negotiation of insurance, shall be deemed material, or defeat, or avoid
the policy or prevent its attaching, unless made to deceive or defraud, or
unless the matter misrepresented increased the risk of loss."
See also Champion Ice Co. v. American Bonding Co., (1903) 115 Ky.
863, 75 S..W. 197.
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-without regard to actual loss to the surety or increase in the
risk.120
3. If the changes in the principal contract, or inequitable
transactions by the party secured affecting performance by the
principal, substantially increase the chance of non-performance
by the principal, the surety is discharged.
4. Changes in the contract and deviations therefrom and
transactions by the party secured which result merely in in-
creased expenditure by the surety in making good the default
of the principal give the surety a defense pro tanto.
5. Non-prejudicial variations or transactions not coming
within (I) and (II) give no defense to the surety.
B. Rights and Remedies of the Corporate Surety.
The real test of whether "corporate suretyship" has ceased to
be fundamentally suretyship comes in the cases which involve
questions of re-imbursement, subrogation, exoneration and con-
tribution, for these are the peculiar rights and remedies which
have characterized the suretyship relation. No case shows a
tendency to modify these, and references to insurance are made
only to explain that insurance rules can not apply.
In Maryland Casualty Company v. Hjorthl2T the surety com-
pany sued on a note given to the surety company after the de-
fault of the principal. The note was executed by the principal
and another and guaranteed by a third person. The surety com-
pany made good the loss and in the instant case was suing on
the note. The chief defense was no consideration. The surety
company contended that the note was given to induce the plain-
tiff surety company to continue on the bond and that its consent
to so continue on the bond constituted a consideration. The trial
court submitted this question to the jury:
"Did the plaintiff, in consideration of the execution and delivery of the
note in question by the defendants, refrain from cancelling its bond?"
The jury answered "No." Judgment was rendered for de-
fendants and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment with an order to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
The court found the consideration in the obligation of indemnity
arising out of the suretyship relation. The following excerpts
are from the court's opinion:
"While it is universally held that the contract of an indemnity company
guaranteeing to an employer the fidelity of employees is a contract of
126 No decision expressly on this ground.
127 (1925) 187 Wis. 270, 202 N. W. 665.
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insurance, such holdings have generally been in cases involving the rights
of the insured against the indemnity company and have related to a con-
struction of the contract of insurance."
"Although there is a dearth of authority upon this question, it would
seem that where an employee makes application to an indemnity company
to guarantee his fidelity to his employer, the relation of principal and
surety, or of principal and guarantor, is created just as much as though
the application had been made to a private surety individual and such
individual had executed a bond to the employee. We so hold."
"It is well supported by authority that, after the contract of suretyship
has been entered into and before a breach, the liability of the surety to
pay the principal's debts constitute a sufficient consideration for security
turned over to the surety by the principal."
While considering a question of subrogation the Supreme
Court of North Dakota 28 expressly declared that the rights of
the corporate surety in this respect were the same as those of a
private surety.
"The plaintiff insists thot, by reason of the fact that it was a compen-
sated surety, the defendant cannot claim the right of subrogation to which
the ordinary surety is entitled. We think, however, that the defendant's
right as a surety are to be determined by its legal status as surety and
not by the reasons which may have induced it to enter into that status.
In other words, the fact that the defendant was a surety for compensation
did not deprive it of the rights that it was entitled to under the rules gov-
erning the relation of surety and principal. On the other hand the con-
tract of indemnity set out in contracted form that which equity would in
any event have given."12 9
In the very recent case of Mellette Farmers' Elevator Com-
pany v. H. Boehler Company'30 the court very distinctly poiits
out that as respects its right of indemnity a corporate surety
company has as complete remedy as a private surety. The
surety company had paid a judgment against it to the extent
of the penalty of its bond and asked to come in as a creditor
128 Gilbertson v. Northern Trust Co., (1925) 53 N. D. 502, 207 N. W.
42.
129 For other cases recognizing the usual benefits of subrogation see:
State v. Hartford Accident etc. Co., 248 Pac. 432; Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Federal Construction Co. et al. (Minn.), 1926, 209 N. W.
911; Southern Surety Co. v. Holden etc. Company, 14 F. (2nd) (411), 1926;
Fidelity v. Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Risien et al. (Court Civil Appeals
Tex.) 1926, 284 S. W. 977; The Same v. School Board et al. (District Court
W. D. La., 1926) 11 Fed. 2nd 404.
But a surety company is not subrogated to right of obligee against
defaulting bank, though paying the full penalty of the bond, where obli-
gee's indebtedness was not satisfied; Maryland Casualty Company v. Fouts
et al. (Circuit Court Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1926) 11 F. 2nd, 71.
10 (Feb. 11, 1927) District Court D, Minn., Fourth Division, 18 Fed.
2nd 430.
SURETYSHIP DECISIONS
against the receivership of the principal debtor, although other
creditors were within the protection of the bond and had not
been paid in full. In allowing the claim of the surety company
the court said:
"When a contract of suretyship is made there arises, in the absence of
an express agreement, an implied contract that the principal will indemnify
the surety for any payment that it may be required to make under the
contract of suretyship. This implied agreement comes to life when a con-
tract of suretyship is made; from that time on the relation of debtor cred-
itor exists between the surety and principal. The payment of money under
the contract by the surety merely fixes the amount of the damages for
which the principal is liable, and relates back to the time the contract
was entered into."
"If the claim of the surety were based on subrogation, the situation
would be different. The rule is that a surety liable for only part of the
debt does not become subrogated to collateral or to remedies or rights
available to the creditor, unless he pays the whole debt or it is otherwise
satisfied."
"The reasons for the diversity of opinion arising out of situations,
such as this, appear to be the failure to distinguish between an express
or implied contract of indemnity and the right of subrogation, together
with the desire to postpone the reimbursement of a paid surety until all
the obligees have been paid in full. However natural that desire may be
it should not be permitted to override well established principles. If surety
bonds are adequate to meet the needs of a situation, the obligees will be
paid in full and the surety left to reimburse itself from the assets of the
principal so far as possible. Where such bonds are inadequate to meet
a situation, there seems to be no logical reason for excluding a surety
from participation, as a general creditor, after it has paid the full loss
indemnified against."
CONCLUSION.
In respect to rights of indemnity, subrogation, and contribu-
tion, the courts have recognized that corporate suretyship is
suretyship in the accepted sense. Whatever changes in facts
have occurred, it is still true that the corporate surety is obli-
gating itself to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another, and is entitled to have the burden ultimately borne by
the principal. There is, likewise, no change in the facts which
would call for a modification of the rights of subrogation, con-
tribution, and exoneration, and there has been no indication
of any tendency to restrict these rights of the corporate surety.
In respect to interpretation and construction of the contract
and defenses of the surety, considerable modification of the rules
applied in private suretyship cases has occurred. As far as
interpretation and construction are concerned, the net result
of calling the corporate surety's bond a policy of insurance has
been to enable many courts to reach a desirable result by the
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slot-machine method instead of by the sounder, but more exact-
ing method of determining what rules, or what modifications of
rules, are demanded by the new facts and changed situation.
The modifications of the old absolute defenses of the private
surety are consistent with rules of contracts law, and are sound,
not because the corporate surety is an insurer, but because
the contract of the surety company with the party secured and
the circumstances under which it is made call for an application
of the rules of contracts generally to breaches of contract by
the party secured. The corporate surety does not have all the
legal advantages given the private surety for the reason that
the facts which have made the private surety the "favorite of
the law" are not present. The fact that the corporate surety re-
ceives compensation and negotiates directly with the party se-
cured, and avowedly upon the basis that there is a chance of
non-performance on the part of the principal, and the further
fact that the compensation is accepted for the assumption of the
risk, do not make. it an insurer, These facts simply leave no
basis for imposing on the party secured any special duty toward
the surety apart from the provisions of the contract. On the
other hand, in the case of the private surety, the absence of an
express assumption of the risk of non-performance by the prin-
cipal, the gratuitous nature of the surety's undertaking, the fact
that he is in a very true sense at the mercy of the principal
and creditor, in short, the whole situation is such as to put on
the promisee a duty to avoid any act which might prejudice the
interests of the surety. Under cover of the "favorite-of-the-law"
fetish, the courts of law and of equity have, in effect, imposed a
standard of conduct on the promisee of a surety comparable to
that of a fiduciary. He must not only avoid any act which in-
jures the surety, but even any act which might in theory con-
ceivably injure him. A word is changed in the contract!!
Metaphysically considered, the old contract is destroyed, dis-
solved into legalistic air. As for the new contract, non haec in
foedera veni! The surety is released not because of injury to
himself, but because of the creditor's failure to come up to the
high standard of conduct required of him. But any -such stand-
ard of conduct imposed upon the party secured who deals with
the modern corporate surety company would be without any
moral or legal justification. The surety company is in the
business of assuming risks of non-performance and pays losses
out of the proceeds of the business. The creditor and surety
meet on a business basis and expectations and standards of
conduct incident to business transactions are appropriate. De-
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claring that the corporate surety is not a "favorite of the law"
merely means that the facts do not call for an imposition of a
fiduciary standard of conduct upon the party secured. Or, put-
ting it another way, when the courts say that the corporate
surety does not need the protection of the courts, they merely
mean that the facts are no longer such as to throw upon the
creditor a special duty of protecting the interests of the surety,
which duty, if existing the courts would enforce. The result
of all this is a modification of the relational bond that exists be-
tween the private surety and the party secured; and consequent-
ly, in matters of interpretation and construction of the contract,
and to a large extent in matters of breach of contract, the gen-
eral rules of contracts law must be applied. But the materiality
of a breach of the contract, and consequently the determination
of whether the surety shall be absolutely discharged, or limited
to a pro tanto recoupment, largely depend upon the peculiar
character of the surety's obligation and the principal-surety rela-
tion.
The statements of the courts vary from the unqualified dec-
laration that the corporate surety is an insurer and engaged in
the business of insurance to the more guarded statement that
when a surety company becomes obligated on its bond, "the rela-
tion of principal and surety, or of principal and guarantor, is
created just as much as though the application had been made
to a private individual and such private individual had executed
a ond to the employer."' 131 The positive statements to the ef-
fect that the surety company is an insurer are almost exclusively
found in the cases dealing with interpretation and construction
of the "policy" or with the question whether surety corporations
should come within the operation of statutes regulating insur-
ance companies. It can make very little difference to call the
corporate surety an "insurer" and his contract a "policy of in-
surance" when the problem is to interpret or construe the con-
tract. The substantial effect is to get back to general rules of
interpretation which should be applied. But the insistence that
the surety company is an insurer only confuses the true situa-
tion when dealing with the rights, remedies, and defenses, of.the
surety, which are tied up with the principal-surety relation;
and for the treatment of which, rules of insurance furnish no
help. For rights, remedies, and defense of the surety company
can not be disassociated from the tripartite relation of the party
secured, the principal obligor and the party secondarily liable,
181 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hiorth, supra, p. 299.
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even though the latter be called an "insurer." Granting that
the contract of the surety company and a policy of insurance
have certain features in common, there is still this very essential
difference: the contract of the surety company per se creates
the relation of suretyship with all its special rights, duties, and
liabilities, while an insurance contract in itself never creates
a tripartite relation analogous to the suretyship relation. The
interests involved in the suretyship relation are far more intri-
cate and more delicately balanced than those in the bipartite
relation of insurer and insured. If the insured and insurer
agree to modify a contract of insurance, no difficult questions
are involved. Neither can modify it without consent of the
other, but no third person's interests are involved. Let the party
secured and the principal in a suretyship relation modify their
contract, however, as they can legally do, and instead of the
simple questions of the effect upon their legal relations, there is
the more difficult task presented of weighing the effect of these
modifications upon the promise of the surety, and of determining
what legal results should follow. The sound attitude seems to
be: avoidance of categorical treatment, re-examination of the
reasons of the rules applied to private suretyship, both in respect
to the contract of the surety and to the relational characteristics,
and then, retention, modification, or rejection of these rules in
the light of the facts and of the proper function of corporate
suretyship, as a security device, not as an insurance arrange-
ment. For the true function of corporate suretyship in modern
business is not primarily to repair loss but to make contracting
parties secure against loss; to supply the element of financial
security in transactions, which is the sine qua non of our
enormously developed, but delicately balanced, economic system
resting, as it does, on credit.
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